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The United States is one of a handful of nations in the world whose constitutional
court judges serve until they pass away or choose to retire. Periodically scholars and
occasional politicians start advocating for term limits for Supreme Court justices –
typically, eighteen years, to allow for regular replacement every two years of one
of the Court’s nine justices. (The number nine is set by statute, and there are also
occasional outbursts of interest in changing that number, but I don’t discuss such
proposals here.) The proposals have come from the left and the right – though
typically from the left when conservatives are thought to control the court and from
the right when liberals are thought to do so.
The passing of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her replacement by Judge Amy
Coney Barrett has led to a spike in interest in imposing term limits for Supreme
Court justices. The proposals now on the table are for doing so by statute because
amending the U.S. Constitution is so difficult (and because getting a controversial
amendment adopted typically takes such a long time that, aside from amendments
dealing with purely technical matters, only proposals with a social movement behind
them can move politicians to trigger the amendment process). These statutory
proposals face constitutional and political obstacles, which in combination make their
adoption unlikely.
The Constitutional Issues
According to the Constitution, all judges on the national courts of the United States
serve “during good Behavior.” They can be removed by impeachment, and a statute
allows a council of judges to take all cases away from judges who become mentally
or physically disabled. Otherwise, the “good Behavior” provision is taken to mean
that these judges have tenure in their positions for life.
How, then, can a statute impose a term limit? The relevant clause reads, “The
Judges, both of the supreme and the inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior.” Proponents of statutory term limits argue that the Constitution
doesn’t define the “Office” a judge holds. So, they say, Congress can define an office
this way: “Justice of the Supreme Court for eighteen years and thereafter a judge on
the court of appeals.” (There are a number of technical details about which courts
of appeals the term-limited justices would sit on, but the details are irrelevant to the
constitutional analysis.)
Opponents of statutory term limits counter with another constitutional provision. The
Appointments Clause says that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint … Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States….” This provision distinguishes between
Supreme Court justices and lower court judges (who are “other Officers”). That
- 1 -
distinction, the argument goes, implies that – whatever one might say about lower
court judges – Supreme Court justices are appointed to a single office defined by the
Constitution.
The difficulty with this counterargument is that there appears to be no other context
in which the distinction between the “office” of a Supreme Court justice and the
office of a lower court judge makes any difference whatever: Both groups are
removable by impeachment, both have salaries guaranteed against reduction,
the jurisdiction of both sets of courts is subject to regulation by Congress. So,
proponents of statutory term limits reply, the asserted distinction might be textually
available, but what reason do we have to adopt it, in terms of the understandings of
the founding generation or of good constitutional design? Without a cogent argument
that statutory term limits threaten some core constitutional values like judicial
independence – and it is difficult to see how they would – a democratically taken
decision resting on another textually available construction of the Constitution’s
terms should prevail. (The idea that Congress’s decision should be given some
“margin of appreciation” has been invoked in some discussions.)
I personally believe that the proponents of statutory term limits have the better of
the argument. But one has to note that the Supreme Court itself would determine
whether the statute is constitutional, and some observers suggest that the Court
would be skeptical about upholding legislation that its members might see as an
attack on the Court as an institution. (As an aside: How would a constitutional
challenge reach the Court? Presumably when a litigant with a case before the Court
seeks to disqualify a newly appointed justice whose commission defines the office as
term-limited.)
The Political Issues
Term limits for judges are popular in the United States. Almost all judges on state
courts have limited terms, and many legislators and chief executives also are term-
limited. And, in light of the fact that both conservatives and liberals have periodically
supported term limits, one might think that a political deal could be struck to impose
them.
The political obstacles to doing so, though, are not small. The most important one
is the question every member of Congress is said to fear: “What have you done
for me lately?” That is, no one thinks that a statute can terminate the tenure of a
justice already sitting on the Supreme Court. (The technical argument is that the
commission of each sitting Justice defines the “office” simply as “justice of the
Supreme Court.”) Term limits, then, can apply only to newly appointed justices – and
there’s no telling when there will be an opportunity to appoint a new justice. Statutory
term limits have no immediate political payoff.
One recent proposal attempts to get around this difficulty by authorizing new
appointments every two years until all currently sitting justices leave the Court by
death or retirement. The Court’s size might gradually increase, but would ultimately
return to nine. That’s ingenious, and does have some near-term payoff – but getting
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one justice every two years might not offer a good enough answer to the “what have
you done for me lately?” question.
Coupled with the constitutional uncertainties, the deferred political payoff of a term-
limits statute makes enacting one rather unlikely.
The Bottom Line
Yet, though a term-limits statute might not be adopted, perhaps proposing one might
have some effect. There’s decent evidence from political scientists to the following
effect: As the number of bills – mere proposals – aimed at reining in the Supreme
Court increases, so does the chance that the Court will rein itself in, eliminating the
political pressure for Court reform. (The mechanism behind this effect is obscure, but
it probably involves decisions by one or two justices to withdraw from positions they
had already taken, or at least to refrain from moving forward along a path to which
they had seemed to be committed.)
Oddly, then, the United States might end up with a nine-member Supreme Court
staffed by justices with life tenure – but chastened by the judges’ awareness that
many political actors thought that they had gone off course.
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